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Gödel’s Master Argument: What is it, and
what can it do?
David Makinson
Department of Philosophy Logic and Scientific Method, London School of
Economics
Abstract
This text is expository. We explain Gödel’s ‘Master Argument’ for incom-
pleteness as distinguished from the ‘official’ proof of his 1931 paper, highlight
its attractions and limitations, and explain how some of the limitations may be
transcended by putting it in a more abstract form that makes no reference to
truth.
Keywords: Gödel, Master Argument, Incompleteness.
1 Introduction
Gödel’s ‘Master Argument’ is sketched in his brief correspondence with Zermelo in
late 1931. It is discussed in an influential 1984 article of Feferman [2], and may be
found in books by several authors, most accessibly [8] and its website spin-off [9]
. However, the argument is not as widely known as it should be, and its strengths
and shortcomings compared to the ‘official’ proof appear not to have received much
discussion. Moreover, an interesting abstraction on the Master Argument that over-
comes some of the shortcomings, can be found only deep within the pages of special-
ist presentations such as [10] and [3], difficult to untangle from other material. The
present article may thus be useful for those with limited time and energy but still
wishing to have a proper understanding of what is going on in the Master Argument.
We begin by recalling the 1931 exchange of letters between Zermelo and Gödel,
and itemize the background needed to continue reading. The Master Argument is
then presented in its simplest available form, followed by a discussion balancing its
attractions and limitations as well as an alleged philosophical weakness. We finally
give a more abstract and powerful, but still easy, version of the Master Argument
in which arbitrary ‘oracles’ take the place of ‘truth in the intended model’, thus
transcending some of its limitations.
The author wishes to thank Jon Burton and Peter Smith for remarks on an ancestor of this text.
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2 Autumn 1931
Gödel announced his incompleteness results in an abstract of 1930 and published
them with proofs in his celebrated paper of 1931. Ernst Zermelo, already famous
for his work on the axiom of choice and what we now call the Zermelo-Fraenkel
axiomatization of set theory, read the 1931 paper and heard Gödel speak on it at a
conference that summer. But he saw it as fatally flawed and ultimately not of great
significance.
Both views appear to have stemmed from his disinterest in studying axiomatic
systems that are formulated in finitary languages, a fortiori in doing so only by
finitary means. Roughly speaking, Zermelo believed that we should be studying
systems that embody broad swathes of mathematics, and that we should feel free
to use any of the resources of mathematics in doing so. Both the formal systems
studied and the reasoning used in that study could be infinitary along lines that he
hoped, in the letters, to make precise at a later date.
This perspective evidently contrasts with that of Hilbert, which was adopted by
Gödel in his published paper. The formal object-language that Gödel examines is
defined by finite means and the investigation, conducted in a distinct and rather
informal language, uses only finitary and constructive reasoning.
To be sure, in following decades logicians began relaxing these restrictions. Some
investigated languages that are in one way or another infinitary, while others used
free-wheeling methods with infinite sets, transfinite ordinals and the axiom of choice
even when studying finitely generated systems. But in all cases they, like Hilbert
and Gödel, continued to maintain a clear distinction between the system that is
under study, formulated in an ‘object-language’, and the means used to study it,
expressed in a (usually less formal) ‘metalanguage’.
In contrast, Zermelo was unable or unwilling to make the distinction between
object and metalanguage, and it seems to be that which led him to believe that
Gödel’s proofs harboured paradox. On 21 September 1931 he wrote to Gödel, hint-
ing at his own general perspectives and outlining explicitly a contradiction that he
claimed to have discovered in the paper.
Gödel replied on 12 October. He did not comment on the differences in general
perspective, but responded in detail to the specific claim of paradox, carefully show-
ing why his proof did not generate the contradiction that Zermelo thought he had
found. At the same time, in an effort to help Zermelo see what was going on, he
outlined the essence of his argument in a manner quite different from that of the
version published earlier in the year. He did this again in an address in Princeton in
1934, but never elaborated it in print. After his death in 1978, the three letters con-
stituting the Zermelo/Gödel exchange were found, published and translated. The
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proof there sketched came to be known as ‘the Master Argument’.1
3 Background needed
We assume that the reader is familiar with the notation of first-order logic, and
has seen the standard first-order axiomatization of the arithmetic of the natural
numbers. We write PA (Peano Arithmetic) for the axiomatization, LPA for its
formal language, N for the set of all natural numbers themselves.
On the semantic level, we presume familiarity with the notion of a model for a
first-order theory, the recursive definition of satisfaction/truth in a model, and the
concepts of soundness and completeness of a given theory with respect to a given
model. On the syntactic level, the concepts whose definitions should already be
familiar are those of a sentence (closed formula) of the language, free and bound
variables, the consistency and negation-completeness of an arbitrary first-order the-
ory and, for the particular case of PA, the notion of ω-consistency. With that basis,
the reader will be able to verify from the definitions the easy parts of Figure 1 (all
of them for PA and some for arbitrary first-order theories) namely the three vertical
arrows and, given them, the following interrelations between the arrows:
• The diagonal full arrow follows from the top one,
• The diagonal dotted arrow follows from the diagonal full one,
• The bottom arrow follows from the diagonal dotted one,
• Conversely (and a little less obviously), the diagonal dotted arrow follows from
the bottom one (the verification of this will be recalled in Section 4).
4 The Master Argument
The Master Argument has two parts: an Inexpressibility Lemma and an Express-
ibility Lemma; its conclusion arises from the collision of the two.
1Who coined the term ‘Gödel’s Master Argument’? The author has not been able to determine
this with certainty. It is used as if familiar in [8], and already appeared tentatively in the first
edition of that book (2007). In response an inquiry from the present author, Smith recalled that he
had been using the phrase for some time in lectures in Cambridge, but could not remember whether
he devised it himself or took it from another source. Of course, the term ‘master argument’ had
already been used for certain other celebrated, although highly contested, demonstrations. It was
applied in Greek antiquity to an argument of Diodorus Cronos about future and necessity, and since
1974 has been used to highlight one of Berkeley’s arguments about existence and the mind (see the
relevant Wikipedia articles).
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Figure 1: Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem for PA
Definition 4.1. A set S ⊆ N is said to be expressible in LPA iff there is a formula
ϕ(x) of that language, with one free variable x, such that for all n ∈ N ,
n ∈ S iff ϕ(n) is true in the intended model for PA
where n is the LPA numeral for n.
Fix any enumeration ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕi, . . . , (i < ω) of all the formulae in LPA whose
sole free variable is x. Put D+ to be the set of all natural numbers n such that ϕn(n)
is true in the intended model for PA, and let D− be the set of all n such that ϕn(n)
is not true (i.e. false) in the same model. Clearly these two sets are complements of
each other wrt. N , that is, D− = N\D+ and D+ = N\D−.
Lemma 4.2 (Inexpressibility Lemma2). Neither D− nor D+ is expressible in the
language of PA.
2The formulation of the Inexpressibility Lemma 4.2 that is given here differs slightly from that
sketched by Gödel in his letter to Zermelo, which has been followed in later presentations (e.g.
Feferman, Smullyan, Fitting, Smith). On those accounts the lemma states the inexpressibility
of truth itself (in other words, is exactly Tarski’s Theorem), while on our account it states the
inexpressibility of the sets D+, D−. Our formulation has the advantage that it simplifies the proof
of the Inexpressibility Lemma 4.2, at the cost of then having to derive Tarski’s Theorem from it
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Proof. For D−, suppose for reductio that it is expressible in LPA. Then by the
definition of expressibility 4.1, there is a formula ϕ(x) with x as sole free variable
such that for all n ∈ N,n ∈ D− iff ϕ(n) is true in the intended model. Now,
ϕ(x) = ϕk(x) for some k ∈ N . So, instantiating n to k we have: k ∈ D− iff ϕk(k) is
true in the intended model. But by the definition of D−, we also have that k ∈ D−
iff ϕk(k) is not true in that model, giving a contradiction. Turning to D+, it suffices
to note that if D+ is expressed by formula ϕ(x) then D− is expressed by ¬ϕ(x).
The second part of the Master Argument is a contrasting Expressibility Lemma.
The sets D+, D− were defined using the notion of truth in the intended model of
PA. We may also consider what happens if in the definitions we replace that notion
by provability in the axiom system PA. Fix separate numberings of all formulae of
LPA with just one free variable x, and of all derivations of PA. For brevity, write
|PA| for the set of all sentences that are theorems of PA. Put D+|PA| to be the set of
all natural numbers n such that ϕn(n) is provable in PA, and let D−|PA| be the set
of all n such that ϕn(n) is not provable in PA. Again these sets are complements of
each other, so that one of them is expressible in the language of PA iff the other one
is. But their behaviour is different from that of D+, D−. Indeed, as Gödel showed:
Lemma 4.3 (Expressibility Lemma). If PA is sound wrt. its intended model, then
both D+|PA| and D
−
|PA| are expressible in the language of PA.
Proof. (sketch) It suffices to show this for D+|PA|. Consider the relation that holds
between a derivation δm and a formula ϕn(x) with just one free variable x iff the
former is a derivation of ϕn(n). Then (as outlined by Gödel with more detailed
verifications in later presentations, e.g. [9]), assuming that the enumerations are in
a certain technical sense ‘acceptable’, this relation is primitive recursive and so is
captured in PA by some formulae ψ(y, x) in the following sense: for all m,n ∈ N ,
1. if δm stands in the relation to ϕn(x) then ψ(m,n) ∈ |PA| and
2. if δm does not stand in the relation to ϕn(x) then ¬ψ(m,n) ∈ |PA|.
Now suppose that PA is sound wrt. its intended model. We want to show that the
formula ∃yψ(y, x) expresses D+|PA|. That is, we need to check that for all n ∈ N ,
n ∈ D+|PA| iff ∃yψ(y, n) is true in the intended model.
as is done in Section 5 point iii. The more common formulation eliminates any need for the latter
derivation, but at the cost of a more complex proof of inexpressibility. This is a small matter of
trade-offs.
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Left to right: Suppose n ∈ D+|PA|. Then by definition, ϕn(n) ∈ |PA|. Hence
there is a derivation δm of ϕn(n), so δm stands in the relation to ϕn(x) so, by (1),
ψ(m,n) ∈ |PA|, so by first-order logic ∃yψ(y, n) ∈ |PA|. Thus by the supposition of
soundness, ∃yψ(y, n) is true in the intended model as desired.
Right to left: Suppose n 6∈ D+|PA|. Then by definition, ϕn(n) 6∈ |PA|. Hence
there is no derivation δm of ϕn(n), so no δm stands in the relation to ϕn(x) so, by
(2), ¬ψ(m,n) ∈ |PA| for all m ∈ N . Thus by soundness, ¬ψ(m,n) is true in the
intended model for each m ∈ N , hence ∀y¬ψ(y, n) is true in the intended model, so
∃yψ(y, n) is not true in the intended model, as required.
The semantic incompleteness of PA emerges immediately from the collision be-
tween these two Lemmas.
Theorem 4.4 (Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem (semantic version)). If PA
is sound wrt. its intended model then it is incomplete (wrt. the same).
Proof. It is immediate from the two results that the set of all sentences of PA that
are true in the intended model is not the same as the set of all provable sentences
of PA. Recall that soundness means that the latter set is included in the former;
completeness is the converse. Thus if PA is sound, it is not complete.
Corollary 4.5. If PA is sound with respect to its intended model then it is negation-
incomplete.
Proof. This is simply an application to PA of the fact, mentioned in the last bullet
point of Section 3, that for arbitrary first-order theories and intended models, the
bottom arrow of the diagram implies the diagonal dotted one. Details: Suppose PA
is sound wrt. its intended model. Then by incompleteness there is a sentence ϕ of
LPA such that ϕ is true in the intended model of the theory but is not derivable
in the theory. Hence ¬ϕ is false in the intended model, so by soundness it is not
derivable in the theory. Thus neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ is derivable in the theory, which is
to say that it is negation-incomplete.
5 Three attractions
We articulate three important attractions of the Master Argument, before looking
at shortcomings in the following section.
i. A striking feature of the Argument is the way that it decomposes the proof
of the incompleteness theorem into two contrasting lemmas, thus providing a
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simple overall architecture. Moreover the diagonal argument for the first, ‘neg-
ative’ lemma is (in the present formulation) of the utmost simplicity, almost
equal to that of Cantor’s theorem in set theory. It is true that the second, ‘posi-
tive’ lemma remains long and tedious to check out in full detail, but at least the
tedium is localized. Overall, one can say that the Master is the simplest and
most transparent argument available for the semantic incompleteness, given
soundness, of systems such as PA.
ii. Another feature of the proof is the prominent place that it gives to the notion
of expressibility of subsets of N in the language LPA of Peano arithmetic,
alongside the quite distinct notion of derivability of sentences from the axioms
of PA. Since the formulation of the incompleteness theorem for PA speaks only
of truth and provability, students easily assume that that is all it is about. Yet
there are less expressive sub-languages of PA (indeed quite interesting ones)
for which complete (and natural) axiomatizations are available. A well-known
example is the sub-language in which zero, successor and addition remain but
multiplication is absent.
Expressive power and derivational power are thus two quite different capacities
and can run in opposite directions. The former concerns the language alone
and has nothing to do with provability from axioms; the latter is about which
sentences, among those available in the language, are provable. The distinction
is easily obscured by loose talk of the ‘strength’ of a system where it is left
vague what kind of strength is meant. The salience that the Master Argument
accords to the notion of expressibility has the merit of putting it on a par with
that of provability.
iii. A third advantage of the Master Argument is that it reveals the close con-
nection between Gödel’s first incompleteness results and another celebrated
theorem of mathematical logic: Tarski’s 1933 theorem [11] on the indefinabil-
ity of the notion of truth in LPA (or more expressive systems). We can state
it (for LPA) as follows.
Consider any enumeration ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψi, . . . , (i < ω) of all sentences (formulae
with no free variables) of LPA, and let T (the ‘truth set’) be the set of allm ∈ N
such that ψm is true in the intended model of PA. Then:
Theorem 5.1 (Tarski’s Theorem). T is not expressible in LPA.
Proof. (sketch)
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We apply the Inexpressibility Lemma 4.2. By definition, n ∈ D+ iff ϕn(n)
is true in the intended model for PA, which holds iff there is an m with
ψm = ϕn(n) and m ∈ T . Now, it is not difficult (though tedious) to show
that the relation that holds between n and m iff ψm = ϕn(n), is expressible in
LPA, so if T is also expressible in LPA then D+ must also be so, contrary to
the Inexpressibility Lemma 4.2. Thus T is not expressible in LPA.
6 Two limitations
However, as presented above the Master Argument has two important limitations.
i. It yields only the semantic version of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem
(soundness implies incompleteness and thus also negation-incompleteness).
It does not give us Gödel’s stronger syntactic version (ω-consistency implies
negation-incompleteness); nor the yet stronger syntactic version obtained by
Rosser (plain consistency implies negation-incompleteness); nor again Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem (to the effect that if PA is consistent then its
consistency cannot be proven by means executable within the system itself).
However this ceiling on content can be raised. In the next section we formulate
a more powerful version of the Inexpressibility Lemma 4.2, in which ‘truth in
the intended model’ is replaced by an arbitrarily chosen ‘oracle’, and show
how this, when combined with a corresponding variant of the Expressibility
Lemma 4.3, gives us Gödel’s syntactic version of the incompleteness result (the
diagonal full arrow in the diagram) by a proof just as short and transparent
as before.
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that there is no visible way of using such
oracles to obtain a similar proof of the Rosser version (top arrow), nor of
Gödel’s second theorem (not in the diagram), so there still remains a ceiling,
albeit rather higher, on what the argument can achieve.
ii. This limitation is related to the fact that The Master Argument is not con-
structive. As Gödel put it in his letter of 12 October 1931, “it furnishes no
construction of the undecidable statement”. That is to say, it does not exhibit
a specific sentence of LPA that is both true in the intended model and under-
ivable from the axioms of PA (under the supposition of soundness). Nor does
it give us a recipe for constructing such a sentence – it merely guarantees that
there must be one. In contrast, the proof in the 1931 paper is constructive in
every detail.
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Assessment of this feature will vary with one’s philosophy of mathematics.
Doctrinal constructivists take the view that non-constructive proofs are in-
valid: they fail to show existence and at best can be taken as heuristic encour-
agements for devising properly constructive proofs of their results. There are
few mathematicians and philosophers who would take such a position, but any
who do must see the Master Argument as incorrect, with the real proof being
the considerably more complex constructive one.
On the other hand, one may be constructively inclined without being doctrinal
about it. There are results that most logicians are quite happy to establish non-
constructively, for example the completeness of classical first-order (or even
propositional) logic using the Lindenbaum-Henkin method of maxi-consistent
sets of formulae. Since the 1930s mathematicians and logicians have gradually
become more comfortable working with explicitly non-constructive principles,
in particular the axiom of choice.
So a less radical view of the situation is that non-constructive proofs are per-
fectly valid, but give less information than their constructive counterparts
when the latter are available. If one sees the additional information as im-
portant for one’s purposes – as will often be the case in computer science –
then one might describe oneself as a ‘light constructivist’. While granting that
non-constructive arguments are valid and frequently shorter and more trans-
parent than constructive ones, the light constructivist is happy to put up with
additional complexity in constructive reasoning to get further information.
In the present instance, the additional information that can be provided by
a constructive proof appears to be needed for going on to Rosser’s improved
version of the completeness theorem, and likewise for Gödel’s second incom-
pleteness theorem. Its absence from the Master Argument is thus an important
limitation. However, it may be said that the non-constructive proof still de-
serves a place alongside constructive ones because of the attractions mentioned
above – simplicity and transparency of architecture, salient role of the notion of
expressibility, and close connection to Tarski’s theorem. In the author’s opin-
ion, it is the version to teach to non-specialists seeking a good understanding
within a limited time-frame.
7 A philosophical weakness?
A further shortcoming, or at least potential one, was mentioned by Gödel in his
letter to Zermelo: unlike the published proof, the Master Argument is “not intu-
itionistically unobjectionable”.
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Of course, non-constructivity is already objectionable to intuitionists, but the
Master has a further feature that they do not accept: its use of the notions of truth
and falsehood in mathematics. Intuitionists baulk at the idea that mathematical
propositions have an objective truth-value beyond our ability to give intuitively
satisfying demonstrations or refutations of them. For this reason, they do not accept
in their full generality certain principles of classical propositional (and first-order)
logic, most conspicuously the law of excluded middle, double negation elimination
and one half of contraposition. But the very notion of expressibility, which features
essentially in both lemmas for the Master Argument, is defined in terms of truth
and falsehood in an intended model, and the law of excluded middle is implicit in
e.g. the last sentence of the proof of the Inexpressibility Lemma 4.2.
In the early 1930s, intuitionism was a live option as a philosophy of mathematics,
and its perspectives influenced the way in which Gödel presented his official proof
of the incompleteness theorems. This is clear from a famous “crossed-out passage
in an unsent reply” (Feferman’s memorable phrase) written on 27 May 1970 to
graduate student Yossef Balas. There Gödel said: “However in consequence of the
philosophical prejudices of our time . . . a concept of objective mathematical truth as
opposed to demonstrability was viewed with greatest suspicion and widely rejected
as meaningless.” As Feferman observes in his paper of 1984, it is clear that when
establishing his incompleteness result Gödel did not himself share that suspicion.
But he nevertheless refrained from using the notions of mathematical truth and
intended model out of an abundance of caution or, to put it more plainly, from fear
of adverse reception by the mathematical community of the time.
Today intuitionistic logic is more an object of study than a code to live by.
Few logicians and fewer mathematicians have any qualms about using the law of
excluded middle or double negation elimination. Should we still retain any suspicions
about the notion of truth in the intended model of a first-order theory? This is a
philosophical question, and it would be rash to think that only one answer is possible.
But many feel that there is no intrinsic difficulty with this concept. On the one hand,
we can define the domain of the intended model, and the values to be given to the
primitive operations of successor, addition and multiplication, within the confines
of a quite small fragment of set theory; on the other hand we can define the truth-
values of complex formulae, in that model, by recursion in the manner that was
articulated by Tarski and is now standard.
On this view, there are really only two shortcomings to the Master Argument:
a ceiling on what it shows and its non-constructivity. The canvassed philosophical
weakness of relying on the notion of ‘truth in the intended model of PA’, is not a
ground for serious concern.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that the Master Argument may be re-run
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on a purely syntactic plane without any reference to truth in the intended model.
Thus, even if one has residual worries about that notion, they become irrelevant.
The re-run has, moreover, a technical benefit: it can be done in such a way as to yield
Gödel’s syntactic version of the first incompleteness theorem (ω-consistency implies
negation-incompleteness), thus raising somewhat the ceiling on content although
remaining non-constructive. While a little more abstract than the basic version of
the Master Argument, it is no more complex. We turn to it now.
8 The Master Argument without truth
We begin by generalizing the definition of expressibility. The definition in Section 4
took a set S ⊆ N to be expressible in the language of PA iff there is a formula
ϕ(x) with one free variable x, such that for all n ∈ N , n ∈ S iff ϕ(n) ∈ T where,
we recall, T stands for the set of sentences that are true in the intended model for
PA. Evidently, this definition continues to make sense if we replace T by another
set of sentences of LPA; we can indeed generalize from T to an arbitrary set X of
sentences, as follows.
Definition 8.1. Let X be any set of sentences in the language of PA; we call it an
‘oracle’. We say that that a set S ⊆ N is expressible according to (the oracle) X iff
there is a formula ϕ(x) with one free variable x in LPA such that for all n ∈ N ,
n ∈ S iff ϕ(n) ∈ X.
In particular, S is expressible according to the oracle T iff it is expressible tout
court. The generalized definition 8.1 allows us to formulate a syntactic version of
the Master Argument, using lemmas that follow the originals but with certain small
changes.
As before, fix an enumeration of all formulae in the language of PA with just
one free variable x. Generalize the definitions of D− and D+ thus: for any set
X of sentences in the language of PA, put D−X (resp. D
+
X) to be the set of all
natural numbers n such that ϕn(n) 6∈ X (resp. ∈ X). Clearly these two sets are
complements of each other wrt. N , and as particular cases we have D−T = D− and
D+T = D+.
The Inexpressibility Lemma modulo an oracle 8.2 for D−X is formulated just as
for D−, but for D+X we need the hypothesis that X is well-behaved wrt. negation,
in the sense that for every sentence ϕ in the language of PA, exactly one of ϕ,¬ϕ is
in X. To appreciate the force of that hypothesis, note that one half of it (at least
one of ϕ,¬ϕ is in X) is just negation-completeness, while the other half (at least one
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of ϕ,¬ϕ is not in X) is immediately implied by consistency. Indeed, if one assumes
that X is closed under classical consequence, then the second half is equivalent to
consistency. We have no need to make that assumption, but doing so would cause
no harm to the argument.
Lemma 8.2 (Inexpressibility Lemma (modulo an oracle)). Let X be any set of sen-
tences in the language of PA. Then D−X is not expressible according to the oracle X.
Moreover, if X is well-behaved wrt. negation, then D+X is not expressible according
to X.
Proof. For D−X , we argue exactly as before with X in place of T . Suppose for
reductio that it is expressible according toX. Then by the definition of expressibility
according to X, there is a formula ϕ(x) with x as the sole free variable such that
for all n ∈ N , n ∈ D−X iff ϕ(n) ∈ X. Now ϕ(x) = ϕk(x) for some k ∈ N . So,
instantiating n to k we have in particular k ∈ D−X iff ϕk(k) ∈ X. But by the
definition of D−X we have k ∈ D−X iff ϕk(k) 6∈ X, giving a contradiction.
For D+X , suppose for reductio that it is expressible according to X by a formula
ϕ(x) and that X is well-behaved wrt. negation. Then for all n ∈ N , n ∈ D+X iff
ϕ(n) ∈ X iff ¬ϕ(n) 6∈ X. But then n ∈ D−X iff n 6∈ D+X iff ¬ϕ(n) ∈ X, so that D−X
is expressed by the formula ¬ϕ(x) according to X, contrary to what we have just
shown.
The Expressibility Lemma modulo an oracle 8.3 runs parallel to its unmodulated
counterpart, with D+|PA| replacing D
+ = D+|T | and expressibility according to the
oracle |PA| replacing expressibility tout court. This forces two rejigs. Since truth is
no longer involved, the lemma requires the condition of ω-consistency rather than
soundness in the intended model; since expressibility of a set S ⊆ N according to the
oracle |PA| does not in general follow immediately from the same for its complement
N\S, the lemma covers only D+|PA| and not D−|PA|.
As before, we fix separate acceptable numberings of all formulae with just one
free variable x and of all derivations of PA.
Lemma 8.3 (Expressibility Lemma (modulo an oracle)). If PA is ω-consistent,
then D+|PA| is expressible according to the oracle |PA|.
Proof. As in the proof of the Expressibility Lemma 4.3, consider the relation that
holds between a derivation δm and a formula ϕn(x) with just one free variable x iff
the former is a derivation of ϕn(n), and recall that this relation is captured in PA
by some formulae ψ(y, x) in the sense that for all m,n ∈ N ,
1. if δm stands in the relation to ϕn(x) then ψ(m,n) ∈ |PA| and
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2. if δm does not stand in the relation to ϕn(x) then ¬ψ(m,n) ∈ |PA|.
Now suppose that PA is ω-consistent. We want to show that the formula ∃yψ(y, x)
expresses D+|PA| according to the oracle |PA|; that is: for all n ∈ N , n ∈ D+|PA| iff
∃yψ(y, n) ∈ |PA|.
Left to right: Suppose n ∈ D+|PA|. Then by definition, ϕn(n) ∈ |PA|. Hence
there is a derivation δm of ϕn(n), so δm stands in the relation to ϕn(x) so, by (1),
ψ(m,n) ∈ |PA|, so by classical logic ∃yψ(y, n) ∈ |PA| as desired.
Right to left: Suppose n 6∈ D+|PA|. Then by definition, ϕn(n) 6∈ |PA|. Hence
there is no derivation δm of ϕn(n), so no δm bears the relation to ϕn(x) so, by (2),
¬ψ(m,n) ∈ |PA| for all m ∈ N . Thus by the ω-consistency of PA, ∃yψ(y, n) 6∈ |PA|
as desired.
Those who relish fine detail may compare the verifications contained in the last
two paragraphs with their counterparts in the Expressibility Lemma 4.3. Both
directions have indeed become a little simpler as a result of dealing with the oracle
|PA| rather than the truth-set T : in the left to right direction, we could simply omit
the last sentence of the previous version; in the converse direction, the last sentence
brings ω-consistency into play in lieu of soundness modulo PA.
The syntactic version of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem appears immedi-
ately from the collision between the two oracular lemmas.
Theorem 8.4 (Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem (syntactic version)). If PA
is ω-consistent then it is negation-incomplete.
Proof. Suppose for reductio that PA is ω-consistent and negation-complete. Using
ω-consistency, the Expressibility Lemma modulo an oracle 8.3 tells us that D+|PA| is
expressible according to |PA|. But ω-consistency immediately implies consistency
so, combining that with negation-completeness, |PA| is well-behaved wrt. negation.
So the second part of the Inexpressibility Lemma modulo an oracle 8.2 tells us that
D+|PA| is not expressible according to |PA|, giving a contradiction.
It is also possible to put Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth into a
form that is no longer about truth in the intended model, but about an arbitrary or-
acle satisfying certain syntactic conditions. However, the details of both formulation
and proof are a little more complex than we wish to handle here. We have gone only
so far as is needed to render the Master Argument immune to the criticism that it
uses the general notions of truth and falsehood of sentences of PA, and to raise the
ceiling on its content to cover the syntactic version of Gödel’s first incompleteness
theorem. Readers who would like to see ‘oracular’ versions of Tarski’s Theorem are
directed to the texts of Smullyan and Fitting in the list of resources that follows.
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